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ABSTRACT 
This paper will examine the implementation of scene-change detection and radio 
frequency technology within a Dual Containment / Surveillance (C/S) System. 
Additionally, this paper will examine the human performance factors in the operation of 
these systems. Currently, Westinghouse Savannah River Company utilizes the 
Continuous Item Monitoring and Surveillance System (CIMS) in the performance of 
Dual C/S to monitor special nuclear materials within International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) Safeguards and Domestic Safeguards. CIMS is comprised of the 
Material Monitoring System (MMS) (R), a multi-media electronic surveillance system 
developed by Sandia National Laboratory which incorporates the use of active seals 
commonly called Radio Frequency Tamper Indicating Devices (RFTIDs), NT Vision 
(R) as developed by Los Alamos National Laboratory, a Microsoft Windows NT (R)  
based operating system providing for domestic scene-change detection  and the Digital 
Multi-Camera Optical Surveillance System (DMOS) (R) which provides scene-change 
detection for IAEA.  Although this paper will focus on the implementation of Dual C/S 
utilizing the Continuous Item Monitoring and Surveillance System, the necessity for a 
thorough review of Safeguards and Security requirements with organizations and 
personnel having minimal to no prior MPC&A training will also be covered.  Successful 
Dual C/S implementation plans must consider not only system design and failure modes, 
but must also be accompanied with the appropriate ‘mind shift’ within operations and 
technical personnel.  This is required to ensure completion of both physical and 
electronic activities, and system design changes are performed conscientiously and with 
full awareness of MPC&A requirements.   
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Continuous Item Monitoring and Surveillance System (CIMS) was installed to meet 
the requirements of DOE Order 474.1A, “Control and Accountability of Nuclear 
Materials” to allow extension of nuclear material storage surveillance periodicity. The 
CIMS system allows for the performance of Dual Containment / Surveillance (C/S) of 
the designated stored material within the Westinghouse Savannah River Company. 
CIMS is comprised of the Material Monitoring System (MMS) (R), a multi-media 
electronic surveillance system developed by Sandia National Laboratory which 
incorporates the use of active seals commonly called Radio Frequency Tamper 
Indicating Devices (RFTIDs), NT Vision (R) as developed by Los Alamos National 
Laboratory, a Microsoft Windows NT (R)  based operating system providing for 
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domestic scene-change detection  and the Digital Multi-Camera Optical Surveillance 
System (DMOS) (R) which provides scene-change detection for IAEA.   
 
This paper outlines the strategy for the implementation of Dual C/S within existing 
Material Control and Accountability structures, including control, operability and 
compensatory measures to be implemented during system/component failure, and data 
archive/retention requirements.  In addition, this paper will examine the human 
performance factors in the operation of theses systems. 
 
IMPLEMENTATION 
INCENTIVE: 
DOE Order 474.1A currently allows extensions in inventory periods for Material Balance 
Areas (MBAs) from the nominal semi-annual period to up to a 5 year intervals under 
combinations of enhanced materials control measures.  This allowance within the Order 
is intended to motivate application of advanced technology to improve overall Material 
Control and Accounting (MC&A) and reduce exposure of personnel to radiation during 
physical inventories.  Westinghouse Savannah River Companys Nuclear Material 
Management has completed installation and startup, and placed into operation, the CIMS 
system in the implementation of Dual Containment / Surveillance (C/S) of the designated 
stored material. 
 
EQUIPMENT: 
Surveillance Systems utilize devices in such a way that each possible diversion path is 
covered by at least one surveillance device (Single C/S).  In a dual C/S system, each 
diversion path is covered by two surveillance devices that are functionally independent 
of each other in their Activation Mode (i.e. active tag, optical, etc.). The Westinghouse 
Savannah River Company has selected and utilizes Active Tag and Optical modes of 
activation.  The Continuous Item Monitoring and Surveillance System (CIMS) and its 
components (MMS, NT Vision, and DMOS) comprise the Dual C/S System.  CIMS is 
credited within the determination of inventory frequency for the extension to the 
domestic and international inventory periodicity, for providing remote inventory 
capability, and is utilized within the performance of Daily Administrative Checks 
(DAC).  
 
The Active Tag mode of operation is fulfilled by the Material Monitoring System 
(MMS).  MMS is comprised of RFTIDs, transceivers, antennas, data collection and data 
storage computers, barcode input devices, and a graphical user interface for monitoring 
the status of material under surveillance. The MMS electronic surveillance system 
incorporates the use of electronic seals with fiber optic loops referred to as Radio 
Frequency Tamper Indicating Devices (RFTIDs). RFTIDs provide inventory 
surveillance of stored shipping packages, and provide real-time tampering indication 
through the use of a visual display and audible alarms on a centrally located computer 
work station.  The active seal reports the RFTIDs State of Health (SOH) in a user 
defined periodicity, as well as integrity and environmental condition. 
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The Optical activation mode of operation is met by the NT Vision system.  NT Vision 
provides a visual record of activities in a defined field of view and is used to monitor 
movements of material or handling of equipment under surveillance.  The NT Vision 
system monitors scenes and pinpoints additions, removal or changes to the material 
inventory.  During normal operation NT Vision monitors a designated area, referred to as 
the ‘Region of Interest’ (ROI), by comparing time dated images.  Once the system has 
established its reference images, changes to those images will cause an alarm and the 
scene will be recorded.  The frequency of recorded images is set as needed for the 
activities of interest and is set in accordance with the estimated time required for the 
activities that are intended to be recorded by the system, while these activities are in the 
field of view of the system.  NT Visions image change detection system utilizes multiple 
cameras, digital image servers, a monitoring computer, and the NT Vision software to 
monitor the storage facilities.  The NT Vision cameras are located as required for 
complete coverage of the material storage arrays. A NT Vision camera grid identifying 
camera overlap and coverage of each camera is developed to maximize Dual C/S status.   
This will allow an alternate or overlapping camera to provide surveillance should a 
camera fail. 
 
BARRIERS TO IMPLEMENTATION 
Common barriers to implementation of Dual C/S include operator interface human 
reliability errors, a willingness to redefine common definitions and performance 
requirements, establishment of technical and administrative operability requirements, 
proceduralization of Dual and Single C/S modes of operation to include compensatory 
measures for failure of both Single and Dual C/S modes operation, alarm response, and 
configuration management. 
 
• HUMAN RELIABILITY ERRORS 
Implementation of Dual C/S within operational facilities should be recognized as a 
source of increased operator stress and thus an increase in human errors is likely.  
Worker stress is likely attributed to a change in mental processes as the worker shifts 
from physical requirements to mental requirements; from routine to unfamiliar with 
new and first time task;  from manual task completion to computer based task, and 
from lack of commitment to newly implemented technologies. 
 
• REDEFINING COMMON DEFINITIONS  
Implementation of Dual C/S requires a willingness to redefine common definitions.  
Some of these definitions will require paradigm shifts in implementation 
methodologies, while other will be new definitions to the operators thought 
processes.   Some new and redefined terms, from an operational point of view,   
include surveillance, which must be defined and accepted as being inclusive of both 
physical and electronic inspections, the introduction of unattended and remote 
monitoring, Electronic Daily Administrative Check, and physical and remote 
inventory capability. 
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• ESTABLISHMENT OF TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL 
PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS  
Consideration must be given to the technical capability and operational requirements 
of the C/S system to perform its intended function, as is installed and in regards to 
future upgrades and maintenance.   
 
The technical capability should be based on the function of the system; selection of 
equipment with proper sensitivity, tamper resistance, reliability, data quality and 
authentication; equipment installation and maintainability to intended performance 
level, frequency of C/S data review; and prevention of false alarms.  Additionally, 
consideration should be given to data storage methods of retrieval and archive, 
battery life expectance, tamper-indicating protection, remote data acquisition (i.e. 
State of Health (SOH) monitoring, etc.) automated means [barcode, Personal Digital 
Assistant (PDA), etc.] of data input, near-real time event notification, Region-of-
Interest control over monitored/unmonitored areas of the storage room, video 
capture rate and image clarity.    
 
Operability of the CIMS system should be defined for both the Active Tag and 
Optical systems as well as for the overall joint system capability of dual C/S.  System 
operability requirements should be incorporated for individual component failure as 
well as system failures.  A system component failure does not constitute total system 
failure or loss of surveillance. Example: a single camera failure vs. a computer 
failure.  Specific attributes of system operability should be inclusive of time lapse 
recorded image verification, region of interest coverage, and performance testing of 
the CIMS critical system elements.  Performance Test Plans should be developed to 
identify Critical System Elements.  Performance tests should include: 
 
• Alarm Sensitivity 
• Region of Interest boundaries 
• Change Detection Sensitivity 
• Light/Dark Lighting Changes  
• Active Tag and Optical seal system modes of alarm activation 
• image degradation comparison for each operable camera 
 
 
DUAL AND SINGLE C/S MODES OF OPERATION TO INCLUDE 
COMPENSATORY MEASURES FOR FAILURE OF EACH 
The Westinghouse Savannah River Company NMM Storage Facility implements the 
‘physical and remote inventory’ frequency (extended) when operating under approved 
single/dual C/S.  For material that is not within single/dual C/S coverage due to system 
maintenance or failure, and therefore not under any electronic surveillance, the ‘physical 
inventory frequency (reduced)’ shall be implemented.  Implementation of Dual C/S, the 
impact of single system failure (Single C/S) and required compensatory measures is 
delineated within the following matrix:  
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 CIMS Operability Matrix 
 
NT Vision
Out of 
In Service Service
MMSDual 
Single C/S C/S 
 
 
 
For SRS NMM storage facility, this means all materials that are not under either single or 
dual C/S will be subject to physical inventory and measurement per an approved 
measurement sample plan.  In the event of a single system failure, the remaining 
operating system will be used to perform the electronic DAC by ensuring that no 
unexplained events since the last DAC have occurred. If an event alarm or a potential 
malevolent act is detected by either system in single C/S mode, planned compensatory 
measures will be implemented.  Manual DACs will be performed in the event that both 
systems fail.   
 
Additional consideration should be given to:  
Alarm response and responders 
RFTID type, design, and frequency and broadcast range 
Out of 
Service 
MMS 
NT Vision 
 
Single / C/S 
 
Manual
DACs
In 
Service 
Optimum Inventory 
Frequency  
Optimum Inventory 
Frequency 
 Compensatory
 Measures 
Implemented 
Optimum Inventory
Frequency 
 Reduced InventoryCompensatory
Measures 
Implemented   
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Radio frequency transmitting device security plan 
RFTID storage requirement (pre/post programming)  
RFTID testing  
Destruction methodology of electronic platform Tamper Indicating Devices 
 
CONCLUSION: 
Successful Dual C/S implementation plans must consider not only system design and 
failure modes, but must also be accompanied with the appropriate ‘mind shift’ within 
operations and technical personnel.  This is required to ensure completion of both 
physical and electronic activities, and system design changes are performed 
conscientiously and with full awareness of MPC&A requirements.   
 
 
 
